The present study aims to resolve the apparent contraction between recent research showing that familiarity experiences may increase stereotyping and the common belief that familiarity should decrease stereotyping. We argue for a "usability" rather than a "heuristic processing" perspective and show that familiarity increases the usability of available information. When this information consists of a stereotype, or categorical information, stereotyping is increased; in the absence of such categorical information, however, stereotyping is decreased. These effects were shown in a classic person perception paradigm in which the familiarity with a target person and the information given about the target person were varied. In line with our usability hypothesis, familiarity led to more stereotyping when a stereotype was provided, whereas it led to less stereotyping when the integrating stereotype was omitted.
Maitner, Crump, Garcia-Marques, and Mackie (2006) investigated this question and showed that familiarity may actually increase stereotyping. Their explanation of this effect suggests that familiarity is a cue that regulates information processing such that it works more heuristically. Therefore, people process information more shallowly and form more stereotyped judgments when they experience familiarity. Despite the convincing evidence Smith et al. (2006) present in favor of their idea, an interesting question remains unanswered, namely, whether the same effects would result if someone you actually know triggered the familiarity experience. Consider the above example once more: Would you also rely more on stereotypes if the guy in front of you was your colleague?
By taking another perspective on how familiarity experiences might influence (person) judgments, we hold that it actually makes a difference what people have on top of their minds when predicting the direction of how familiarity experiences influence stereotyping. We aim to provide a common framework in which both more and less stereotyping can be the result of familiarity experiences. In particular, we argue that the experience of familiarity enhances the judged usability of the (person) information at hand and therefore leads people to form (person) judgments on the basis of what is on top of their minds. Therefore, familiarity may, depending on the nature of the available information, lead to both more and less stereotyping.
hEuriSTiC prOCESSiNG Or ENhaNCED KNOwlEDGE uSabiliTy? Smith et al. (2006) do not only provide compelling data, but also a theoretically sound explanation of their findings: As cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) , people readily rely on general knowledge and stereotypes in the presence of (contextual) cues signaling that cognitive resources can be saved (see also Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 1996) . Familiarity may apparently act as such a cue and may thus induce heuristic processing, thereby increasing stereotyping (see also Garcia-Marques & Mackie, 2001; Reder & Ritter, 1992; Smith & DeCoster, 2000) . Importantly, however, although Smith and colleagues provide clear support for the effect hypothesis that familiarity can lead to increased stereotyping, they provide no direct evidence for the process hypothesis that this effect is caused by an increase in heuristic processing. Thus, the door is open for alternative explanations. Below, we will present evidence for an alternative explanation that is based on the notion that familiarity increases "the judged usability" of information (i.e., the subjective degree to which specific information seems helpful for, e.g. the formation of a judgment, see also Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007) . In order to make our point clearly, we will start by describing the paradigm used by Smith and his colleagues at some greater detail.
In the Smith et al. experiments, participants were first exposed to pictures of a variety of people. Next, in the second phase of the experiment, participants were presented with a number of person descriptions consisting of a portrait that was either part of the set presented in the first phase (i.e., a familiar) or a new one (i.e., unfamiliar), the occupation of the person (i.e., categorical information meant to activate an occupational stereotype), and a small paragraph of written information about the person. This information included some counterstereotypical (with respect to the provided category) individuating information. Finally, participants were asked to indicate their evaluations of the target person on several stereotypical traits.
1 As a result, Smith et al. (2006) found that people formed judgments based more strongly on the categorical information (i.e., the occupation of the target person) when familiar targets were at stake than when unfamiliar targets were to be judged.
How should this effect be interpreted? We argue that at least two processes may be playing a role. First, and in line with the explanation of Smith and his colleagues, the results might be interpreted as being the consequence of heuristic processing. That is, participants who experienced familiarity simply processed the categorical information (i.e., the occupation of the target person potentially opening a stereotype) about the target person and neglected the individuating information because they were in a heuristic processing mode (see also Bless et al., 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000) . Second, however, the results may also be explained by an enhanced reliance on the categorical information that was given: Familiarity experiences are associated with truth and trustworthiness and may thus lead perceivers to rely more on this information than on unfamiliar information (Reber & Schwarz, 1999 ; see also Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) . Stated differently, the familiarity experience triggered by the face of the target person could have been misattributed to the categorical information, which therefore appeared particularly usable, and consequently biased judgments in its (i.e., a stereotypical) direction (see also Corneille, Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Walther, 1999; Croizet & Fiske, 2000; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994) . On a phenomenological level these two explanations do not diverge that much as both of them lead to increased stereotyping; as long as there is categorical information available, we should add. As we shall argue in the following, the two process assumptions bear dramatically different predictions for how familiarity affects judgments in the absence of categorical/stereotypical knowledge, however.
If usability (rather than heuristic processing) was the process underlying the effects reported by Smith et al. (2006) , simply omitting the categorical information (i.e., the occupational stereotype) when participants are exposed to the target person should turn the original results around: If there is no categorical information readily available, if there is no stereotype on top of participants' minds, then the familiarity experience might enhance the judged usability of the individuating information. Hence, in this case fluency experiences should lead to less stereotyping because now the individuating information rather than the categorical information should be used to form a judgment. Since this information also contains counterstereotypical behaviors, the overall judgment should be less stereotypical. Clearly, such a result would be in contradiction with a "heuristic processing" explanation, as such an explanation would predict that familiarity leads to more stereotyping (i.e., shallow information processing)-independent of whether or not categorical information is provided. The following experiment was designed to test this line of reasoning.
PArTICIPAnTS AnD DESIGn
One-hundred and eight students majoring in different subjects served as research participants. The experiment was part of a larger testing session that took about an hour's time and that was refunded with partial course credit or α7 (approx. $10). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four between-participants conditions of a 2 (categorical information: given versus not given) X 2 (familiarity: familiar versus unfamiliar pictures) X 2 (picture-description match: order 1 versus order 2) mixed factors design in which categorical information and picture-description match were varied between participants and familiarity was varied within participants.
ProCEDurE
Along the lines of the procedures of Smith et al. (2006) , the present experiment had two phases. In Phase 1, participants viewed 30 photos of male faces on a computer monitor, each presented for 3 seconds. It was participants' task to try to remember the faces they were presented with, which they thought would become relevant in a later recognition task.
Subsequently, in Phase 2, participants were presented sequentially with 12 person descriptions. All of these descriptions consisted of a photo of a male face accompanied by a brief text description. Depending on the condition, the text description was either introduced by the current occupation of the target person (i.e., categorical information) or not. Half of the photos were previously presented in Phase 1 (familiar) and half of them were new (unfamiliar). Which photos were presented along which description was counterbalanced. The written descriptions included stereotypic behaviors with respect to the occupation of the target person and individuating information (i.e., counterstereotypical information). This modification of the original materials (that made use of only individuating information) is crucial for our hypothesis that another process than heuristic processing might be at work. Whereas the original stories could only be understood together with the categorical information about the occupation, we had to construct our stories such that they were also understandable without this information; otherwise we could not have omitted the categorical information to begin with. Therefore we described a couple of typical behaviors that could open up a stereotype corresponding to the occupational information that was provided in some of our conditions. Furthermore, some counterstereotypical behaviors were described that overall painted a "somewhat counterstereotypical" picture of the target person, much like in the original studies (i.e., then resulting from knowing a stereotype and the individualizing behaviors). The occupations used were, teacher, accountant, scientist, pilot, manager, shelf-stacker, programmer, builder, medical doctor, artist, nurse, and trucker. For each occupation three traits were chosen that related to the occupational stereotype. For example, the programmer to be described in the following example passage had to be judged on the stereotypic traits boring, lonely, and nerdy:
(I am a computer programmer.) I like working from home the best; everything goes so smoothly and quietly there. In my free time I love doing sports with my family. I love to exercise. I do like reading, too, however, I have a strong preference for computer books. I do not have many friends, but I do not really care as there are enough exciting things going on my life.
DEPEnDEnT vArIAblES
After reading each description, participants were asked to rate each target person on three traits related to the occupational stereotype. All trait ratings were made on 7-point scales (1 = the trait being not at all applicable to target person, 7 = trait is absolutely applicable to the target person). Higher ratings thus indicated a more stereotypic judgment whereas stronger usage of the individuating information was likely to result in lower ratings.
rESulTS
Trait ratings were combined into two scales, one describing the mean rating of familiar persons (i.e., those whose picture has previously been presented) the other describing the mean rating with respect to unfamiliar persons (i.e., those whose picture was new). These scales were analyzed in a 2 (categorical information: given versus not given) X 2 (familiarity: familiar versus unfamiliar pictures) X 2 (picture-description match: order 1 versus order 2) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) in which categorical information and picture-description match were manipulated between participants and familiarity within participants. We predicted an interaction of categorical information and familiarity such that we would find more stereotypic judgments of familiar persons only when the categorical information (i.e., the occupation) was provided. If this is not the case, we predicted the reverse effect. This reversal should be due to the enhanced usability of all the information provided. Since this information consists of stereotypic and counter stereotypic behaviors, the resultant judgment should be less stereotypic as compared to when a category was explicitly provided or when an experience of familiarity was lacking. This predicted interaction was highly significant, F(1, 104) = 16.40, p < .001, η p 2 = .14. Furthermore, the analysis revealed a significant main effect for stereotype information, F(1, 104) = 6.59, p < .05, η p 2 = .06. As Figure 1 indicates, these results pertain to the fact that when the vignettes provided categorical information, familiar persons were judged more stereotypic (M = 4.45, SD = .44) than unfamiliar persons (M = 4.28, SD = .44), T(104) = 2.81, p < .01, η p 2 = .07, thereby fully replicating the findings of Smith et al. (2006) . Conversely, when there was no categorical information introducing the vignette, familiar persons were judged less stereotypic (M = 4.06, SD = .45) than unfamiliar persons (M = 4.26, SD = .53), T(104) = 2.91, p < .01, η p 2 = .08, thus supporting a usability rather than a heuristic processing explanation of these familiarity effects. Importantly, the two unfamiliar conditions (with and without categorical information) yielded about the same judgments, laying somewhere in the middle of the other two conditions. This null effect strongly speaks for the successful construction of our materials: Apparently, the persons described in the vignettes were perceived as about equally stereotypical regardless of whether or not their occupation was explicitly provided, thereby ruling out the alternative explanation that omitting the categorical information would change the character of the vignette.
DISCuSSIon
The present experiment was designed to investigate when familiarity increases stereotyping and when it decreases stereotyping. Two different process accounts were discussed and pitted against each other in the experiment presented here. In particular, based on earlier work in both cognitive and social psychology, Smith et al. (2006) argued that familiarity might instigate heuristic processing and thus increase stereotyping. Alternatively, we proposed that the effects of Smith et al. might have been driven by an enhanced usability of the categorical information that was provided to participants. In particular, we proposed that familiarity might serve as a cue to the usability of the information at hand, thereby adding to the salience and weight of the categorical information in the paradigm used by Smith et al. (2006) . What differentiates these two explanations of the effect of familiarity on stereotyping is the importance of exposure to explicit category information. Whereas a heuristic processing account would predict increased stereotyping independent of whether or not a stereotype was activated (i.e., the occupation was explicitly provided), a usability account would predict increased stereotyping when a stereotype is on top of people's minds and decreased stereotyping when individuating information is on top of people's minds. 
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The current results clearly support a usability account of the effect of familiarity on stereotyping, as we in fact find increased stereotyping for familiar targets that were introduced by an occupational label and decreased stereotyping for familiar targets that were not so introduced. We believe that this finding is in and of itself interesting as it qualifies the reasoning of Smith et al. (2006) . Importantly, this qualification is based on a full replication of the original findings, even though we had to slightly modify the original materials. We are therefore confident that the present research provides a common framework on the basis of which both increased and decreased stereotyping as a consequence of familiarity experiences can be predicted. As such, this framework can also resolve the puzzle Smith et al. (2006) deal with in their general discussion. Specifically, Smith and colleagues conclude in their paper that their seemingly counterintuitive findings might have to do with the "clean" way they induced the feeling of familiarity. Stated differently, the authors posit that they found increased stereotyping of familiar targets because the familiarity they induced was not easily attributed to friendship or personal familiarity. From our point of view, there is another viable explanation for this effect: Because stereotypes are not on top of people's minds when dealing with a friend, the familiarity triggered by friendship or love does not lead them to judge their friends or partners in a more stereotypical way. However, when stereotypes are on top of people's minds, be it because they are all that is activated when they are exposed to strangers about whom they do not know much more than their social identity ("She is German") or because stereotypes are particularly accessible (e.g., because they are used repetitively in an argument; "But she is German!")-then familiarity experiences may in fact increase the use of stereotypes.
Over and above these extensions of earlier work, the present findings are interesting in at least two other respects. First, the present framework may also be used to explain other findings dealing with familiarity and its effect on the regulation of information processing. Second, the mechanism suggested here-fluency as a cue to the usability of information-might apply to fluency research in general, thereby leading to new predictions. We shall briefly present both contributions in the following.
Importantly, the usability account put forth in this article can also be used to explain previous findings in cognitive psychology that have related familiarity to heuristic information processing. As such, Reder and Ritter (1992) demonstrated for instance, that a feeling of knowing triggered by the repetition of a particular problem resulted in a (heuristic) retrieval strategy. In particular, their participants (mis)interpreted the resultant familiarity experience as an indicator of knowing the answer and therefore refrained from actually calculating the correct answer, ostensibly to save cognitive resources. We believe that these results can also be understood in terms of an enhanced judged usability: While quickly searching for the correct answer to the problem, participants who experience familiarity might tend to rely on the first thing that comes to their mind more (because it appears particularly usable to them) than participants who lack this experience. Hence, they opt for the answer given previously and do not calculate the outcome. Even though this account of the findings of Reder and Ritter (1992) must remain speculative at this point, it is important to note that the familiarity and usability mechanism seems to be quite general and does not seem to be bound to stereotyping.
It is exactly this characteristic of the process suggested here, namely its generality, that makes it interesting for fluency research in general. If fluency is indeed a cue to the usability of information, this importantly adds to our understanding of how fluency influences judgments in general. Up to now, research on the effects of fluency has mainly focused on its positive impact on evaluative judgments. Specifically, a host of experiments have demonstrated that fluency biases evaluative judgments in a positive direction (see Winkielman et al., 2003) . One particularly parsimonious explanation of this effect, the hedonic marking hypothesis, holds that fluency triggers positive affect, which is subsequently attributed to the information associated with the fluency experience. It is therefore that we like better what we know, trust more what is familiar, and are more attracted to what is prototypical. Interestingly, the hedonic marking account implies that (evaluative) judgments should be exclusively biased in a more positive direction. However, the usability account we have put forward in the present research suggests that the opposite may also hold: Given that negatively valenced information is associated with a fluency experience, the resultant judgment should in fact become more negative.
rEfErENCES
